The structure of Navy tactics and the tasks it solves. Basic concepts of operational art and tactics of the Navy Basic tactical principles of the operation of naval forces

The construction of a fleet and the improvement of naval art are inseparable from the state’s maritime policy, which ensures its national interests in the World Ocean. Of course, in modern conditions, the priority in ensuring these interests does not belong to forceful methods. But, unfortunately, humanity is still far from solving its problems only peacefully.

War, as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, includes an obligatory element - armed struggle. How a country can prepare for and conduct this armed struggle is being studied by a special field - military science. In turn, the most important component of this science is the art of war, which covers issues related to the preparation and conduct of armed struggle in general, as well as operations and combat operations of various scales - both on land, in the air and at sea. The system for preparing and conducting operations and combat operations at sea for the ocean fleet should have three scales: strategic, operational and tactical.

Thus, depending on the scale of action, the art of war consists of three complementary components: strategy, operational art and tactics. The highest field of military art - strategy. It explores large-scale problems of armed struggle, the solution of which ultimately determines victory in the outbreak of war. Thus, in a broad sense, military strategy should be considered as a state policy in the field of defense, expressed in plans for preparing the country and the Armed Forces to repel an attack from the outside with the subsequent defeat of the attacking party.

In contrast to strategy, lower levels of the scale of action are considered by two other components of the art of war - operational art and tactics.

Operational art occupies an intermediate position between strategy and tactics and plays a connecting role between them. The specific composition and nature of each type of Armed Forces and the conditions for solving their inherent tasks determine the need to develop operational art for each type of Armed Forces, including the Navy.

Operational art is an integral part of military art, covering the theory and practice of preparing and conducting joint and independent operations and combat operations by operational formations of the armed forces in various theaters of military operations; military theoretical discipline. The main tasks of operational art are to study the nature and content of operations (combat operations), develop methods for their preparation and conduct on land, in aerospace and at sea, determine the most effective methods of combat use of types of armed forces and branches of the armed forces in them, as well as methods for organizing interaction between them; development of recommendations for command and control of troops (forces), their operational support and practical management of the combat activities of troops (forces) during operations. Operational art covers the study and development of all types of military operations: offensive, defense, organization and implementation of operational regroupings, etc. Operational art occupies an intermediate position between strategy and tactics and plays a connecting role between them. It directly follows from strategy and is subordinate to it; the requirements and provisions of strategy are fundamental to operational art. In relation to tactics, operational art occupies a dominant position: it determines its tasks and directions of development. There are also inverse relationships and interdependencies. For example, when determining the strategic goals of a war and the methods of waging it in a particular theater of military operations, the real capabilities of operational formations are taken into account, as well as the level of development of the theory and practice of operational art. In the same way, when planning operations (combat actions), the tactical capabilities of formations and units, the nature and characteristics of their actions in a specific situation are taken into account, because Ultimately, tactical successes determine the achievement of operational results, and the latter directly affect the achievement of intermediate and final goals of the strategy. Under the influence of the development of weapons and military equipment, the improvement of the organizational structure of troops, and changes in methods of conducting military operations, the relationships and interdependence between strategy, operational art and tactics are becoming more multifaceted and dynamic. Since operational art resolves issues of theory and practice in preparing and conducting both joint and independent operations by operational formations of the ground forces, air force, and navy, within the framework of its general theory and practice one can distinguish the operational art of the ground forces, air force, and navy. The operational art of each type of armed forces in its development is based on the general methodological foundations and requirements of military theory and practice, taking into account at the same time the specifics of the organization, technical equipment, scope of action, as well as the combat capabilities of operational formations of the corresponding type of armed forces. Basic provisions of O. and. stem from the general principles of military art. The most important of them are: constant maintenance of troops, forces and means in high combat readiness; continuous and bold conduct of military operations in order to seize and maintain the initiative; readiness to conduct military operations by conventional means and with the use of nuclear weapons; achieving the set goals through the joint efforts of formations and associations of all branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces on the basis of their close interaction; concentrating the main efforts of troops in a chosen direction at a decisive moment. The application of general principles in an operation depends on the specific conditions in which the troops will operate.

In the military theory of Western states, the term “operational art” is not used. Instead, the concepts of “grand tactics” or “small strategy” are used.

Tactics as a field of military art, it is subordinate to operational art and strategy and follows from them. Compared to them, tactics are more flexible and sensitive to all changes in the material base of warfare, in people and military equipment. It is people and military equipment that directly influence the means and methods of combat.

Military tactics (Greek taktiká - the art of forming troops, from tásso - forming troops), an integral part of military art, including the theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat by formations, units (ships) and subunits of various types of armed forces, branches of troops (forces) and special forces on land, air and sea; military theoretical discipline. Tactics covers the study, development, preparation and conduct of all types of combat operations: offensive, defensive, oncoming combat, tactical regroupings, etc.

In the Russian Armed Forces, tactics occupies a subordinate position in relation to operational art and strategy. Operational art determines the tasks and direction of development of tactics, taking into account the tactical capabilities of formations and units, the nature and characteristics of their actions. Under the influence of changes in the methods of conducting military operations caused by the adoption of improved weapons by troops (naval forces), the relationship and interdependence between strategy, operational art and tactics become more multifaceted and dynamic.

Main objectives of tactics: studying the patterns, nature and content of combat, developing methods for its preparation and conduct; determining the most effective methods of using weapons of destruction and protection in combat; study of the combat properties and capabilities of units, units, formations, determination of their tasks and battle formations during combat operations and methods of organizing interaction between them; studying the role of fire, strikes and maneuver in battle; development of recommendations for command and control of troops (forces), their combat, special and logistical support; study of the enemy's forces and means and his combat techniques.

Each branch of the armed forces (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy), branch of the military (forces, aviation) and type of special troops, as well as military rear services and units of railway troops, have their own tactics, which studies the combat properties and capabilities of formations , units (ships) and subunits of a given type of armed forces, branch of troops (forces, aviation), type of special troops, methods of their use and actions in battle independently and in interaction with other types and branches of troops. General laws and regulations for the preparation and conduct of combat by formations, units and subunits of all types of armed forces, branches of troops (forces) and special troops form the basis of the general theory of tactics. Exploring the diverse conditions of combat, tactics do not provide ready-made recipes. It develops only the main, most important provisions and rules, following which the commander makes an independent decision that corresponds to the specific conditions of the combat situation, showing creative initiative.

Basic principles of tactics stem from the general principles of military art. The most important of them are:

• constant maintenance of troops, forces and assets in high combat readiness to conduct combat operations with and without the use of nuclear weapons;
• high activity and determination of troops during combat operations;
• close interaction of all branches of the military;
• surprise and secrecy of actions, concentration of forces and means in the most important directions and at the decisive moment, continuity of military operations;
• flexibility in maneuvering troops, forces and means, creation, timely restoration and skillful use of reserves of all types;
• comprehensive support for troops during combat operations.

Types of forces and tasks they solve

Consist of: general purpose forces and special purpose forces, which are used to solve problems in fleet operations, flotillas, squadrons, naval operations and battles, in combat operations and naval battles, joint operations and combat operations of other types of armed forces.

Branch of the Navy

SUBMARINE FORCE

SURFACE FORCES

Surface ships are divided into 5 classes:

Aircraft carriers: to participate in MRAU; covering groupings of disparate naval forces from air and sea strikes; search and destruction of naval forces; ensuring landing of troops.

Rocket and artillery: for the destruction of ground targets, surface ships and submarines; ensuring amphibious landings; protecting their convoys, disrupting enemy sea communications; fire support for coastal troops.

Landing ships: for transportation and landing of troops; transportation in the interests of the front, mine laying.

Tasks: transportation and landing of naval (air-sea landing) troops on the unequipped coast; transportation in the interests of the front; mine laying.

Tactical properties: ability to accept equipment and personnel from the shore and water; transport and land on unequipped shores and water; participate in the fire destruction of enemy targets; make passages in anti-landing barriers in the water; reload troops and equipment from transports at sea and disembark them; ensure the crossing of wide water obstacles by ground forces; lay minefields; hovercraft are capable of quickly moving and landing advanced troops from the sea to the shore. Disadvantages: relatively low speed (20-24 knots), the need to ensure their combat stability; limitation when landing by wave (3 points). STOL – limited range, restrictions on seaworthiness and GMU, insecurity of flexible fences.

Anti-submarine ships: to search and destroy submarines, ensure the deployment and return of their forces, protect their base areas, protect and cover KON, DesO.

Tasks: providing anti-submarine defense of ships and ship groups; search (in the area, at the line, on call) and destruction of submarines along their deployment routes, lines and in designated areas; survey of contact areas/probable location of submarines; disinformation and distraction of submarines from protected objects, displacement; keeping watch in their waters.

Tactical properties: greater autonomy (30 days), ability to replenish supplies at sea; high level of equipment for submarine detection (GAK, RLK, SOKS, RTR), helicopters; significant ammunition for anti-submarine weapons, ensuring multiple attacks by group (5) submarines; the presence of control and communication means that allow you to manage the actions of diverse forces, collect and process data, and timely bring it to the command; good seaworthiness, high pre-cavitation speed (14 knots), ability to interact with ASW helicopters. Disadvantages: low search speed; ability to survey small areas; vulnerability to damage from weapons pl; increased level of own radiation and noise.

Mine sweeping ships: for laying mines and net barriers; conducting mine action.

MARINE AVIATION

Naval aviation is divided into:

• Marine missile carrier (MPA);
• Assault (SHA),
• Anti-submarine (SSN),
• Intelligence (RA),
• Fighter (IA).

MPA: destruction of ships from the AUG, KUG, individual ships in transit, at the turn, in bases; Destruction of KON, DesO at the transition, in loading and unloading areas; destruction of ground facilities, aviation at airfields; laying minefields; conducting aerial reconnaissance.

In peacetime, it performs the tasks of the BS: aerial reconnaissance of forces at sea; identifying the organization and tactics of using enemy forces and assets; surveillance of detected enemy forces.

SHA: destruction of ships alone and in groups; destruction of individual small targets and transports; destruction of individual coastal objects; ensuring the landing of amphibious assault forces and their actions; destruction of airplanes and helicopters; conducting aerial reconnaissance.

SSN: search for enemy submarines, tracking and destruction; anti-submarine support for the deployment and return of its forces; air anti-submarine protection of fleet formations during sea crossings; laying minefields; search and destruction of PDSS; conducting aerial and radar reconnaissance; rescue of aircraft and ship crews.

In peacetime, combat service: searching for submarines in areas and monitoring them; identification of areas and nature of actions; practicing tactical techniques for searching and tracking submarines; grade; assessing the effectiveness of your search tools in real conditions; study of the main characteristics and classification characteristics of pl; development of probable areas of action.

RA: search for enemy naval forces at the crossing, in the area, determination of their composition, movement elements, opening the defense system, conducting surveillance; detection of submarines, determination of their location; identifying fleet forces in ports, bases, and dispersal points; opening of defense elements, bases, positions of military units, warehouses and other military facilities; determination and clarification of the location, parameters and operating modes of shipboard electronic distribution systems; ensuring the guidance of their forces and issuing target designations to them; determining the results of the actions of the fleet forces; determination of hydrometeorological conditions and ice conditions; mine laying and bombing strikes.

IA: covering naval forces at sea and naval facilities from air attack and reconnaissance means; covering naval aviation combat formations; destruction of ASW, AWACS and jammers; destruction of airborne assault forces; disruption of air transport; conducting reconnaissance; destruction of small targets.

The MRA and SHA databases are maintained independently and jointly with other branches of the naval forces and branches of the Armed Forces, as part of the formations: Division/regiment. The main method of action is simultaneous and sequential strikes + search and destruction of aircraft.

COASTAL FORCES

It can land in an independent amphibious assault or as part of the amphibious landing forces of the ground forces.

Goals in an independent landing: creating a landing bridge; assistance to ground forces advancing along the sea coast; improving the conditions for basing naval forces, etc.

MP tasks: capture points, create landing bridgeheads and defend the landing base; capture important objects and positions on the coast, hold them until your forces arrive; capture ports and naval bases; destroy ground-based elements of high-precision weapons and military facilities located on the coast (islands).

Organization of the MP formation: combat units, combat support units and subunits; service units and units; control.

BRAV destroy DesO, KON, NK in the range, participate in ensuring the deployment of their forces and returning them to bases; covers bases, coastal fleet facilities, DesO, fleet groups operating in the coastal direction.

Special purpose units and services carry out reconnaissance, communications, radio surveillance, electronic warfare, hydrographic and hydrometeorological support.

Naval rear - logistics and technical supply and support, storage and repair, restoration of the lost combat capability of naval forces.

Forms of use of the Navy

• first and subsequent fleet operations (within a naval operation);
• combat operations of fleets to defeat naval groups and other important targets;
• the first and subsequent operations of the flotillas;
• combat operations of flotillas, squadrons, groups of heterogeneous strike forces.

V. Valkov, Ph.D., Associate Professor

Naval tactics

an integral part of naval art. Studies and develops methods for preparing and conducting naval combat by heterogeneous forces, the actions of formations, groups and subunits of naval forces during a combined arms battle waged in coastal areas. Includes tactics of the branch forces

submarines, naval aviation, surface ships, coastal missile and artillery forces and marine corps. The tactics of each type of force are developed on the basis of the general principles of naval tactics for them, based on the purpose, classes of ships and weapons used. In submarine tactics, methods of action of single submarines, actions as part of curtains of submarines and tactical groups have been developed. In the tactics of surface ships, the main place is occupied by the development of methods of conducting naval combat as part of groups for various purposes. In the tactics of naval aviation, actions against surface forces by strike and support groups of missile carriers (attack aircraft) and special-purpose aircraft, as well as against submarines independently and in cooperation with anti-submarine ships, are important. In the tactics of coastal missile and artillery forces, methods are being developed to deliver the most effective strikes against enemy warships and their landing forces in cooperation with ground forces. Marine tactics focus on their actions during amphibious landings.

EdwART. Explanatory Naval Dictionary, 2010

See what “Naval Tactics” is in other dictionaries:

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The process of development of naval affairs from antiquity to the present, and at the same time one of the components of naval science (theory of the navy), studying military operations at sea and the forces of military fleets of the past in different eras.... ... Wikipedia

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In 1776, Ushakov took part in a voyage from the Baltic to the Mediterranean Sea. From the end of May 1781, he, commanding the battleship "Victor", sailed for a year in the Mediterranean Sea as part of Admiral Sukhotin's squadron, whose sending there was due to the well-known declaration of Catherine II on armed neutrality. Soon after returning from this voyage, Ushakov took a direct part in the creation of the new Black Sea Fleet and was the first educator of Black Sea sailors.
During this period, linear tactics dominated in the sailing fleets of Western Europe. Its basic principles were formulated at the end of the 17th century by the Frenchman Pavel Gost and set out in his book, published in 1697. These principles were elevated to dogma in a number of navies, and especially in the French and English, and in England they were even included in official instructions and statutes. The fleets were instructed to attack the entire enemy line at once, strictly observing alignment in the ranks, and fire only at the designated ship, not paying attention to the actions of the remaining enemy ships and their own ships fighting nearby. At the same time, ships were strictly forbidden to leave the battle line, as well as to engage in battle with an enemy who had a quantitative superiority in ships. All this fettered the initiative of ship commanders and squadron commanders, leading to stagnation of tactical thought and stereotyped actions during naval battles. In addition, this predetermined defensive tactics, since each of the opponents was afraid of finding themselves in unfavorable conditions. There was no talk of decisive battles. As a result, in the middle of the 18th century, the fleets of Western European states experienced a pronounced crisis in naval tactics.
A different situation developed in the Russian fleet, where from the very beginning of the development of tactical thought, pattern and routine were alien to it. Peter I and subsequent Russian naval commanders introduced a lot of new and original things into fleet tactics. For example, the Gangut victory of Peter I (1714) was an example of a combination of military cunning and maneuver used when a Russian galley squadron met the Swedish naval fleet. Also unique was the attack and destruction of Swedish sailing ships near Grengam by Russian galleys under the command of Golitsyn (1720). It was completely different from the tactics of the fleets of Western European countries and the tactics of the outstanding Russian admiral Grigory Spiridov. In the Battle of Chesme (1770), along with the use of a battle line in building a squadron (during the battle in the Chios Strait on June 24), he masterfully organized the maneuver of a specially designated detachment of ships, which provided (in the battle in Chesme Bay on June 26) artillery support for the firewall attack, as a result of which almost the entire Turkish fleet was destroyed.
But if under Gangut and Grengam the basis of tactics was boarding (galleys against sailing ships), and under Chesma - an attack on the enemy at anchor, then Ushakov enriched the tactics with the widespread use of maneuver in a naval battle. The creative power of Ushakov’s art lay in innovation, in the decisive rejection of outdated views on combat, in the courage of quest.
The novelty of Ushakov’s tactical techniques met with both open and hidden opposition from the reactionary representatives of the fleet, who servile before foreign countries. But the results of the battles conducted by Ushakov were the best defense of his advanced tactical views. In the fight against old, conservative views on the forms and methods of combat, with attempts by foreign naval officers serving in the Russian fleet to impose the tactical techniques of Western fleets, Ushakov’s tactics were more and more thoroughly introduced into the practice of combat operations of the Russian fleet.
Ushakov firmly remembered the warning of Peter I that when using the charters “not to adhere to the rules, like a blind wall, for the rules are written there, but there are no times and cases.” Ushakov's maneuver tactics did not exclude the line as one of the elements of the battle formation, but the line was not the only form of formation for him; it was entirely subordinate to maneuver. Ushakov combined linear order with maneuvering and restructuring into other battle formations and showed examples of offensive tactics of the sailing fleet - enveloping the flank, dismembering the enemy’s formation, etc.
Each battle conducted by Ushakov contained new tactical techniques that corresponded to the specific situation and conditions of hostilities. Already in the battle with the Turkish fleet near the island of Fidonisi in 1788, Ushakov showed himself to be an innovative naval commander.
On June 18, 1788, Russian troops besieged the Turkish fortress of Ochakov. At the beginning of July, Suvorov was summoned to Ochakov from Kinburn, who was entrusted with command of the left wing of the advancing troops. On the same day, June 18, a Russian squadron under the command of Voinovich left Sevastopol for Ochakov. The squadron consisted of two battleships, two 50-gun, eight 40-gun, one 18-gun frigates, 20 smaller sailing ships and two fire ships.
The task of Voinovich’s squadron was to prevent the Turkish squadron from providing assistance to the enemy troops besieged in Ochakov and to assist the Russian troops in every possible way, as well as to prevent the enemy squadron from reaching the shores of Taurida. Due to headwinds, the movement of the Russian squadron was greatly delayed, and it only approached the island of Tendra on June 29. The Turkish squadron spotted here consisted of 15 battleships, eight frigates, three bombardment ships and 21 smaller ships.
At dawn the next day, with a north wind, the Russian squadron approached the enemy, who had taken a windward position, and, having lined up the battle line on the left tack, prepared for battle, expecting an enemy attack (indecision typical of Voinovich). The Turkish squadron, having approached up to three and a half kilometers, entered the battle line. In the first hour of the day there was a calm, and the ships stopped. As the wind picked up, the Russians moved closer again. Then the Turkish ships, taking advantage of the speed (they had copper plating), began to move away without taking the fight. The Russians pursued the Turks, who were leaving for the Rumelian shores, while the Russian squadron sought to take a windward position. By evening the Turks slowed down; The Russians also lowered their sails. As darkness fell, the fleets dispersed again.
On the morning of July 3, not far from the mouth of the Danube, near the island of Fidonisi, the fleets met again. The enemy still maintained a windward position. At 8 o'clock the Russian squadron tacked and lined up in the battle line on the left tack, counter-tack in relation to the enemy. At 2 p.m., the enemy, taking advantage of the windward position, began to descend in two columns, of which the first, under the command of Gesen Pasha, attacked the Russian vanguard, and the second rushed towards the battle cord and rearguard, trying to paralyze them and prevent them from providing assistance to their vanguard ( Ushakov). After 5 minutes the battle began. Two battleships and two 50-gun frigates of Ushakov’s vanguard were attacked, while each of these ships was opposed by five enemy ships. Occupying an advantageous windward position, the Turks kept at a distance that made it impossible for Russian 40-gun frigates with 12-pound guns to fire effectively, due to which only advanced ships (i.e., the vanguard under the command of Ushakov) could operate successfully on the Russian side. .
Despite the unfavorable conditions, the ships of the Ushakov avant-garde fired effectively and accurately at the Turks who attacked him, and after 40 minutes the enemy’s attack was repulsed, and the line of his ships was disrupted. The flagship of the first column itself was forced to leave the line. The enemy's attempt to cut off Ushakov's two frigates - Borislav and Strela - also ended unsuccessfully. Ushakov, on the battleship "St. Paul", taking advantage of the enemy's confusion, himself launched a decisive counterattack and, adding sails, from close range inflicted great damage on the Turkish flagship "Kapudania", forcing it to turn back. When the enemy ship turned, the frigates “Borislav” and “Strela” fired broadsides at it, while the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to respond in kind. Other ships of the Ushakov avant-garde supported the counterattack of their flagship with heavy fire on the frustrated Turkish column.
The battle lasted until 16:00. 55 minutes, after which the enemy ships, having raised all sails, hastened to leave the battlefield, losing the shebeka sunk by the fire of Ushakov’s flagship. The losses of Ushakov's vanguard were only five killed and two wounded. The attack of Ushakov’s vanguard could have brought significantly greater results if not for the inaction of Voinovich, who did not support Ushakov and limited himself to only a rare exchange of fire with the far-flung ships of the second column of the Turkish fleet. Voinovich did not help Ushakov in pursuing the enemy leaving the battlefield. The battle was limited to a battle between the Ushakov vanguard and the numerically superior first column of the Turkish squadron.
On July 5, the Turkish fleet appeared near Ak-Mosque. The Russian squadron patrolling here did not allow the enemy to approach, and the latter was forced to retreat to the Kherson Cape, from where on July 6 it turned out to sea and went to the Rumelian shores.
On July 1, 1788, Russian troops launched their first attack on Ochakov. As a result of the successful actions of Suvorov’s troops during the second half of the year, the Turkish fortress, which was considered impregnable, was taken on December 6.
The Battle of Fidonisi is an example of successful interaction between the squadron and ground forces during operations against the seaside fortress (Ochakov). Ushakov, having taken the initiative, contrary to the canons of formal linear tactics, enters the battle with superior enemy forces and with a bold counterattack delivers the main blow against the Turkish flagship (the first column).
In the battle of Fidonisi, Ushakov violated other requirements of formal linear tactics, which ordered the flagship to be in the center of the line of his ships. Setting an example for the other ships, Ushakov walked ahead. This favorite technique continued to bring him continued success.
On July 8, 1790, Ushakov fought the Battle of Kerch. The battle was preceded by the cruising of Ushakov’s squadron off the Anatolian coast, which lasted from May 16 to June 5, 1790, about which Ushakov wrote: “... Starting from Sinop, he walked around the entire eastern side of the Anadol and Abaza coasts, dominating them with a strong hand, forced two units to leave from Constantinople this spring, squadrons sought their salvation, taking refuge under the fortresses... Being at Sinop for three days, the city, the fortress and the ships were in full attack, having a contented skirmish with them, all the time the cruising ships took the ones they came across and near Sinop they brought them out almost from under merchant ships from the very fortresses...eight ships were taken, two of which were burned, brought out in front of the city at Sinope, and six were brought to Sevastopol...”
On the way back, on the night of June 1–2, Ushakov’s squadron had a battle with the batteries of the Anapa fortress and the Turkish ships stationed near Anapa. Ushakov reported to Potemkin about this battle: “Having launched all the rowing ships, around midnight, he pulled up against the enemy ships and began firing at them with cannonballs, bombs and cannonballs, but against us they fired fierce fire from all the batteries and, also firing with cannonballs, threw small bombs and frames, which, not reaching, exploded in the air, and many cannonballs flew over our ships, and from us several firebrands lay down and burned on the shore near the batteries, and bombs exploded on them.” Only the absence of fireships with the squadron prevented Ushakov from completely destroying the Turkish ships. But this battle was not the main goal of the campaign. Ushakov had long sought to inflict such a blow on the Turkish fleet that would thwart the enemy’s plan to land troops in the Crimea. Back on July 30, 1789, Ushakov reported to the then commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Voinovich, about the preparation of a Turkish landing in the Crimea and that the enemy had designated Anapa as the point of concentration of forces, from where he intended to attack Yenikale and Kerch. Due to the unpreparedness of the Turkish ships, the planned landing in the Crimea did not take place then and was postponed to the 1790 campaign.
The need to replenish ship supplies and carry out minor routine repairs on some ships forced the Russian squadron to temporarily leave for Sevastopol. By this time, Ushakov was appointed instead of the indecisive Voinovich, commander of the naval fleet on July 2, 1790. Ushakov again went to sea, holding the flag on the battleship "Rozhdestvo Khristovo". His squadron included 10 battleships, six frigates, one bombardment ship, one rehearsal ship, 13 light cruising ships, and two fire ships. Before going to sea, an order was sent to all ships: “Announce to every single one in the fleet that the fleet, glorified by victories over the enemy, must increase the glory of the imperial flag, demand that everyone fulfill their duties without sparing their lives.”
Before going to sea, Ushakov received information from observation posts located on the Crimean coast that the Turkish fleet was visible at Tarkhanov-Kut on June 28, then passed a short distance from Sevastopol and Balaklava, after which it headed east. It was obvious that the Turkish squadron headed to Anapa to receive troops and, together with other ships stationed there, move to the Crimean coast to carry out the long-planned landing. Having assessed the current situation, Ushakov decided to leave the Sevastopol Bay to head to the Kerch Strait and take a position near Cape Takly, on the path of the most likely movement of the Turkish landing. At the same time, some of the light cruising ships were sent by Ushakov for reconnaissance. At 10 a.m. on July 8, a Turkish squadron consisting of 10 battleships, eight frigates and 36 smaller ships was spotted from Anapa. The wind was moderate, from the east-northeast. The Ushakov squadron, contrary to the routine rules of linear tactics, which required in such cases to fight not under sail, but at anchor, weighed anchor and, following under sail, lined up in a battle line. At about 12 noon, the Turks launched an attack on the Russian vanguard, commanded by captain of brigadier rank G.K. Golenkin.
The vanguard repelled the attack and threw the enemy into confusion with its fire. Due to the failure of the first attack, the commander of the Turkish squadron (Kapudan Pasha) commissioned new ships to strengthen the attack against the Russian vanguard. Then Ushakov ordered the frigates to leave the general line of formation and form a reserve in order to use it at the decisive moment in the right direction. The remaining ships of the center (corps de battalion) pulled up to the vanguard and began to assist it in repelling the enemy attack. By 2 p.m. the wind direction became north-northeast, which was beneficial for the Russians. Ushakov, taking advantage of this, approached the enemy with a grape shot, put all his guns into action and decisively went on the offensive. Unable to withstand the Russian fire, the Turkish ships that were in close proximity to the flagship of the Russian squadron began to turn and leave the battle. Two Turkish ships, whose masts were damaged, went beyond the line of Russian ships. To cover these ships, Kapudan Pasha tried to pass by the Russian formation on a counter course. The Russian ships, tacking, once again rained down their fire on the Turkish ships from close range. and inflicted further damage on them. Ushakov with particular energy attacked the Turkish commander and his second flagship, who were trying to cover their most damaged ships. By 17:00 the enemy finally gave up resistance and, pursued by Russian ships, began to retreat. In an effort to complete the strike, Ushakov ordered to quickly form a battle line and pursue the enemy, without observing the usually designated places, and he himself took a place in front of his ships.
As a result of the successful battle, the Turkish landing in Crimea was thwarted. Many Turkish ships were seriously damaged, and one messenger ship with its crew was sunk. The Turks lost a lot of killed and wounded. On the ships of the Russian squadron, losses amounted to 29 killed and 68 wounded. On July 12, Ushakov returned to Sevastopol victoriously.
In tactical terms, the Battle of Kerch is characterized by Ushakov’s pronounced desire for decisive offensive actions. Ushakov strives to get closer to the shortest distance, with the goal of using both artillery (card shot) and rifle fire and thereby inflicting the greatest losses on the landing force on enemy ships. This battle was also characterized by the concentration of fire on the Turkish flagship ships in order to deprive the enemy of leadership and steadfastness. It is noteworthy that the frigates were removed from the general formation, as a result of which the maximum density of the linear forces of the squadron was created and the efficiency of artillery fire was increased, as well as the formation of a reserve of ships at the disposal of the flagship. Finally, it should be noted that at the final moment of the battle, Ushakov, contrary to the requirements of formal tactics, in accordance with the current situation, orders the ships to get into formation, without observing the assigned places, and he himself becomes the head of the fleet.
Having made the necessary repairs after the Kerch battle and replenished the ship's supplies, Ushakov again began to prepare for a meeting with the enemy, whose ships again began to appear off the Crimean coast. Ushakov carefully monitored their movements, receiving reports from posts, and sometimes personally traveling to the coast, from where the enemy was visible. At the same time, Ushakov received detailed information from Kherson from the commander of the Liman flotilla De Ribas. who reported to Ushakov about all Turkish ships seen in the area of ​​​​the northwestern coast of the Black Sea. Painstakingly collecting intelligence data, Ushakov carefully prepared for the resumption of active searches for Turkish forces at sea. On August 6, Ushakov wrote to Kherson: “...Today 29 ships were visible... It is very necessary to find out their enterprise in order not only to prevent, but also to take advantage of it... Is it possible, dear sir, through some means from the Danube to find out where now Where is their main fleet, are they united in one place, or will they be squadrons, so that they can direct our actions.”
Ushakov was allowed to go to sea again only after the completion of several ships in the Kherson port, which were supposed to strengthen his squadron. Having received information about the readiness of these ships, on August 24 Ushakov gave the order for both his squadron and the Liman flotilla to leave. On August 25, 1790, Ushakov’s squadron left Sevastopol and headed to the mouth of the Dnieper-Bug estuary, where it was supposed to connect with the Liman flotilla and ships leaving Kherson. Ushakov had 10 battleships, 6 frigates, 1 bombardment ship, 1 rehearsal ship and 17 cruising ships. The Turkish squadron, consisting of 14 battleships, 8 frigates and 14 small ships under the command of Kapudan Pasha Hussein, was cruising off the northwestern coast of the Black Sea at that time.
At 6 o'clock in the morning on August 28, the Russian squadron discovered a Turkish squadron anchored between Tendra and Khadzhibey (Odessa). The appearance of Russian ships was completely unexpected for the Turks. Ushakov decided to use surprise and, without wasting time changing from marching order to combat order, ordered an immediate attack on the enemy.
The Turks, taken by surprise, despite their numerical superiority, hastily began to cut the ropes and at 9 o'clock in disarray they rushed to set sail towards the Danube. Occupying a windward position, Ushakov rushed in pursuit with full sail, intending to intercept the lagging enemy ships. The threat of capture by Russian sailors of the rear Turkish ships forced Kapudan Pasha to turn back and cover the lagging ships. Lowering into the wind, the Turkish fleet hastily lined up the battle line. Continuing to march towards the enemy, Ushakov also rebuilt the squadron from a marching order to a combat one, and then, turning back on course, took a windward position and set on a course parallel to the enemy’s course. At the same time, three frigates were ordered to leave the battle line, form a reserve and stay to windward at the vanguard in order, if necessary, to repel an attempt by the enemy to attack the vanguard.
At about 15 o'clock, Ushakov, having approached the enemy within the range of a grape shot, began a battle with the whole formation, especially attacking the enemy center, where the Turkish flagship ship was located. After an hour and a half of battle, the Turkish ships, having received significant damage and suffered losses in personnel, began to leave the battle line. The Russian ships increased their fire even more and at about 5 p.m. brought the enemy into complete confusion. The Turks could not stand it and, turning to jibe into the wind, began to leave the battle in disarray. When turning, they exposed their ships to the longitudinal salvos of Russian ships.
In an effort to completely defeat the Turkish squadron, Ushakov raised the signal “Drive the enemy,” and he himself began to pursue the Turkish flagship. The pursuit of the departing enemy ships continued until nightfall. At 22 o'clock Ushakov, having sent light ships to Ochakov, anchored. At dawn the next day, the Turkish fleet was again discovered not far from the Russian squadron. As Ushakov reported later in his report, the Turkish ships were sailing in disarray in different directions.
Pursuing the enemy, the Russian squadron cut off two battleships damaged in battle, one of which, the Meleki-Bahri, was captured, and the other, the flagship Kapudania, was on fire and soon exploded. Turkish admiral Seyid-Ali and about 100 officers and sailors from the Kapudaniya were captured. During the hasty flight of the rest of the fleet to the Bosphorus, the Turks lost another heavily damaged battleship and several small ones. Losses in enemy personnel amounted to more than 2 thousand people. The Russians lost only 41 people, 25 of them wounded. The captured battleship "Meleki-Bahri", after correction, became part of the Black Sea Fleet under the name "John the Baptist".
The Liman flotilla, due to headwinds, was unable to connect with Ushakov before the battle. After the battle, she was instructed to take the captured ships to Kherson.
A feature of Ushakov’s tactics in this battle was the sudden attack of the enemy without changing formation from marching order to combat. Otherwise, the same techniques were used as in the Battle of Kerch, i.e. allocation of a reserve of frigates, approaching and fighting at grapeshot range, attacking flagship ships in order to disable them first.
Soon after the Battle of Tendra, Ushakov, based on the combat experience of the last battles (near Kerch and Tendra), proposed to allocate a special group of ships to attack the enemy’s flagships, which was approved by Potemkin. This group of ships was called the Keizer Flag squadron.
Ushakov’s tactical techniques cannot be considered without connection with the entire complex of techniques used in each specific battle. So, for example, in the battle of Tendra on August 28-29, 1790, Ushakov’s attack on the Turkish squadron on the move would not have had an effect in itself without timely formation of a battle line, allocation of reserves and attacks on flagship ships, pursuit of the enemy, etc.
The richness of each of the battles conducted by Ushakov with new techniques, their skillful combination with techniques already known before, clearly confirms the exceptional speed with which he navigated the situation and knew how to make the right decision, and the high degree to which he possessed Suvorov’s “eye.”
In the second half of September 1790, when Russian troops were approaching the Danube, it was necessary to send a rowing flotilla from the Dnieper-Bug estuary to the Danube. Ushakov personally developed an order for the passage of the flotilla, which was handed over to its commander on September 28, 1790, and a plan to cover the flotilla from the sea from possible interference from the Turkish fleet. The general situation after the defeat of the Turkish squadron near Tendra developed quite successfully, but unfavorable winds did not allow the flotilla to leave the estuary for a long time, and therefore Ushakov himself was delayed in leaving. Only on October 16, having received information about the departure of the flotilla, Ushakov went to sea. His squadron included 14 battleships, 4 frigates and 17 cruising ships. On October 17, after a short stay in Khadzhibey, the Liman flotilla, consisting of 38 rowing ships and a detachment of transports with landing forces (800 people), reached the mouth of the Dniester, where the next day it united with a flotilla of Zaporozhye Cossacks consisting of 48 boats and headed to the Sulina arm of the Danube. Here the flotilla was blocked by a Turkish river flotilla (23 ships) and two coastal batteries (13 guns).
By decisive actions of the command of the Russian flotilla, this obstacle was quickly eliminated. The batteries were taken in battle by troops (about 600 people) landed from the flotilla ships, and the enemy flotilla, defeated in battle, having lost a floating battery and 7 transport ships with ammunition and food, hastily retreated up the Danube. Continuing to operate on the Danube, the Russian Liman flotilla occupied the Turkish fortress of Tulcea on November 6 and 7, and the Isakcha fortress on November 13. In battles with enemy flotillas located at these fortresses, a large number of Turkish ships, guns, ammunition and food were destroyed, burned and captured.
In accordance with the plan, Ushakov’s squadron approached the Danube on October 21, when the rearguard of the Liman flotilla was already entering the mouth. Ushakov’s task was to prevent enemy reinforcements from entering the Danube from the sea and thereby ensure the successful operations of the Russian rowing flotilla allocated to help Suvorov. Ushakov remained at the mouth of the Danube until November 10, after which he went in search of the enemy to the Rumelian shores, and on November 14, 1790, when it became clear that the Turkish fleet could not interfere with the actions of the flotilla on the Danube, he returned to Sevastopol.
On November 18, the rowing flotilla began a systematic bombardment of Izmail and the Turkish ships standing under the protection of the fortress. Between November 18 and November 27, the Russian flotilla destroyed 43 coastal vessels, 45 transport ships, 10 boats, a schooner and more than 40 ferries.
Immediately before the assault on Izmail by Suvorov’s troops, the flotilla (567 guns), together with the batteries of Chatal Island, bombarded Izmail, and on the day of the assault participated in the capture of the fortress. It is known that Izmail was taken by a concentric attack of nine columns: six advancing from land and three columns, composed of landing troops, storming the fortress from the river.
The flotilla operated in two lines in the assault on Izmail: in the first line there were ships with landing forces, in the second - ships that covered the landing with the fire of their guns. On the morning of December 11, the flotilla, under the cover of continuous fire from the ship's guns, landed troops. His first column quickly captured the fortifications on the shore. The second column met stronger resistance, but still captured the enemy battery. The third column went ashore in the most difficult conditions, under heavy fire from the enemy redoubt. All three columns, after fierce fighting, joined forces that stormed the fortress from land. On this day, all the fortifications were in the hands of the Russians. The assault on the city itself began, and among the units that were the first to break into the city center were troops landed from the flotilla ships.
Suvorov's capture of Izmail and Ushakov's actions during this period in the Black Sea theater were based on a single strategic plan. By defeating the Turkish fleet at Tendra and subsequent actions, Ushakov ensured the safe passage of the flotilla to the Danube and covered its actions from the sea during the period of direct advance to Izmail, thereby rendering a serious service to Suvorov’s troops. The actions of the Liman flotilla near Izmail were highly praised by Suvorov and Potemkin.
The campaign of 1791 was marked by new successes of the Russian troops. With the support of the river flotilla, the city of Brailov was taken by storm. On June 28, Repnin’s troops defeated an 80,000-strong Turkish army at Machin. With the loss of this army, the enemy lost his last reserves. Peace negotiations between Russia and Turkey, which had begun earlier, soon resumed. The desire of the Russian government for a speedy conclusion of peace was determined by the fact that Catherine II, frightened by the revolution that had begun in France, now saw the main content of her foreign policy in the fight against it. Turkey, having suffered heavy defeats on land, was no longer able to wage any effective war, but, relying on a still strong fleet, it delayed negotiations, trying to negotiate more favorable peace terms for itself.
The matter was accelerated by the brilliant victory of the Ushakov squadron over the Turkish fleet at Cape Kaliakria on July 31, 1791. In this battle, the Russians had 16 battleships, 2 frigates, 2 bombardment ships, a fire ship and 13 light ships; the Turks have 18 battleships, 17 frigates and 43 light ships. The Turkish fleet was commanded by Kapudan Pasha Hussein.
On July 29, Ushakov’s squadron left Sevastopol and headed for the Rumelian shores. At noon on July 31, Ushakov saw a Turkish squadron anchored near Cape Kaliakria. As at Tendra, Ushakov suddenly and swiftly attacked the Turkish squadron, without changing from marching order to combat order. To take a windward position (the wind was north), Ushakov went between the shore and the Turkish squadron and, despite the fire of enemy coastal batteries, at 14:00. 45 min. cut off Turkish ships from the shore. The appearance of the Russian squadron and the attack of the Turkish fleet were so sudden and swift that part of the personnel sent ashore (it was a Muslim holiday) could not return to the ships. The enemy hastily cut the anchors and retreated in confusion, trying to line up the battle line. Continuously attacking the stunned enemy, the Russian squadron continued to be in the marching formation of three columns. Kapudan Pasha managed to line up some of the Turkish ships on the starboard tack, but soon the enemy fleet lined up on the port tack. At 15 o'clock. 30 min. Ushakov, attacking the enemy when the wind was from the north-northeast, formed a battle line parallel to the Turkish fleet.
The advance detachment of the Turks under the command of Said-Ali, forcing sails, tried to take a windward position. Then Ushakov on the ship “Rozhdestvo Khristovo” broke down and attacked Said-Ali’s ship. In his report to Potemkin, Ushakov wrote about this moment of the battle: “At the same time, I noticed that Said-Ali with the vice-admiral's ship of the red flag and other large and several frigates, being the foremost one, was in a hurry to separate forward, winning the wind, therefore, for warning I chased his attack with the ship “Nativity of Christ” after him, following ahead of our line, and with a signal I confirmed to the fleet to carry out what had been done and close the distance. I built a line of our fleet at the closest distance against the enemy and, having caught up with the leading ship of Pasha Said-Ali, with a signal I ordered the entire fleet to descend to the enemy at close range, and the ship under my flag “Nativity of Christ”, approaching the leading our ship at a distance of half a cable , attacked him." Said-Ali's ship, having received severe damage to the hull and mast, sank into the wind. Then Ushakov attacked another flagship, which was forced to turn away with great damage. The attack on the flagships contributed to the rapid demoralization of the enemy squadron.
The stubborn battle, during which the Turkish ships (especially the flagship ones) received heavy damage, lasted more than three and a half hours. The decisive attack of the Russian squadron led to the fact that the Turkish ships were mixed together and began to leave in disarray towards the Bosphorus. Ushakov organized the pursuit of the defeated Turkish fleet. Around 20 o'clock. 30 min. Due to the darkness, the Turkish ships began to disappear from sight. Soon the conditions for pursuing the Turks became extremely unfavorable, as a calm set in, which was then replaced by a favorable one. the enemy by the wind. Only at 6 o'clock in the morning on August 1, the Russians again saw the Turkish squadron moving towards Constantinople. Ushakov added as much sail as he could, trying to catch up with the enemy, but the increasing stormy north wind and strong seas prevented this. In addition, several ships of the Ushakovo squadron were damaged in battle, and on the battleship "Alexander" a dangerous leak formed in the hull from cannonballs, making it impossible to continue the pursuit in stormy conditions. Having sent several ships cruising to the Rumelian shores, Ushakov approached Cape Emine with the fleet and began to repair the damage. Having put itself in order, the squadron returned to Sevastopol. In his report, Ushakov wrote: “During the previous 31 days of battle, all the commanders of the ships and various ranks of the Black Sea Fleet who served on it fulfilled their duty with extreme zeal and unparalleled bravery and courage...” In the same place, Ushakov especially notes the role of reserves in this battle . Thus, a reserve of 24 bombardment ships and one frigate was used in the direction of the main attack, while another reserve, consisting of small bombardment ships and a large number of cruising ships, was used to pursue single enemy ships and destroy the boats with the Turks escaping on them. The report says about this: “and during the cruisers sent from me in pursuit of the ships... many enemy ships were driven ashore, flooded, and some were burned, the fleeing enemy people were beaten and sunk in large numbers...”. In this battle, Ushakov used a new tactical technique - an attack from the shore, a technique that was then adopted by the English Admiral Nelson, using it seven years later in the Battle of Abukir against the French squadron.
Ushakov's victory at Kaliakria decisively influenced the course of the entire campaign. On December 29, 1791, Turkey hastened to conclude peace on terms favorable to Russia. According to the Peace of Jassy in 1791, the terms of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Treaty were confirmed, the new border of Russia along the Dniester was recognized, as well as the annexation of Crimea to Russia.
Showing great skill in naval battles, Ushakov carried out military operations associated with the blockade of the enemy coast, landing troops, attacking fortresses, etc. with no less success. In them, just as in naval battles, he was an enemy of inertia and routine. A clear example of this is the siege and capture of the island of Corfu, which was considered an impregnable fortress.
Ushakov took possession of the fortress at a time when the large commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, which had come to power in France, intensified its aggressive policy. French expansion was directed primarily against England, but at the same time it also threatened Russia and Turkey. Having received Venetian possessions after the defeat of Austria - the Ionian Islands and several fortresses in Albania - Bonaparte tried with all his might to retain them. In his report to the Directory dated August 27, 1797, he wrote: “The islands of Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia are more important to us than all of Italy together.” Bonaparte primarily took into account the strategic position of the Ionian Islands, the mastery of which made it easier for him to advance towards Egypt, Asia Minor, the Balkans and the Black Sea possessions of Russia. In addition, having established himself in the Ionian Islands, Bonaparte became Turkey's neighbor and could exert strong political pressure on it. This is important to emphasize, because France already had quite a lot of influence in Turkey, and she was already inclined towards an alliance with Bonaparte against Russia.
It is quite understandable that these circumstances caused serious concern in Russian ruling circles. The alarm intensified even more when it became known that the French in Toulon and Marseille were intensively preparing for active hostilities. A rumor spread that the French fleet under the Turkish flag would enter the Black Sea and begin military operations against Russia. But soon the direction of French expansion in the Mediterranean became somewhat clearer. Refusing active action directly against the British Isles, Bonaparte launched his Egyptian campaign in May 1798, the main goal of which was to capture Egypt and from there threaten British possessions in India. With their invasion of Egypt, the French committed direct aggression against Turkey, of which Egypt was a province at that time, and created a direct threat to the Turkish Empire, forcing the latter to ask for help from Russia.
Bonaparte's Egyptian campaign also affected the interests of Russia. Having established their dominance in Egypt, the French could constantly threaten the Black Sea straits, and therefore the Black Sea possessions of Russia. In addition, it was completely obvious that Turkey would not be able to protect the passages to the Black Sea without Russian help.
Thus, French expansion in the Mediterranean created an extremely difficult military and political situation not only in the Mediterranean region, but throughout Europe. The complexity of this situation was further aggravated by the fact that an acute crisis was unfolding in Italy at that time. internal struggle: the power of the Bourbons was overthrown, and the king of Italy was forced to flee and ask for help from the Russian Tsar Paul I. In this situation, Russia opposed France.
To participate in the war in the Mediterranean Sea, a squadron was allocated under the command of Admiral Ushakov, which on August 13, 1798 left Sevastopol consisting of 6 ships, 7 frigates and 3 messenger ships. There were 1,700 Marines on the ships. Upon the arrival of the squadron in the Dardanelles, a Turkish squadron consisting of 4 ships, 6 frigates and 14 gunboats came under the command of Ushakov. On September 12, Ushakov sent 4 frigates and 10 gunboats under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Sorokin to blockade Alexandria and destroy the French batteries in Abukir, since Nelson’s English squadron, after the victory over the French, itself turned out to be so battered that it was no longer able to solve combat missions and planned to urgently leave for Sicily. On September 20, the Russian and Turkish squadrons left the Dardanelles. In a short time, from September 28 to November 5, Ushakov expelled the French from the islands of Tserigo, Zante, Kefalonia and Santa Mavra. Following this, he launched an effective blockade of the island of Corfu with the aim of capturing it.
The island of Corfu has long been considered the key to the Adriatic Sea. For five centuries it was owned by the Venetians, who did a lot to strengthen it. After Napoleon captured the island, French engineers significantly strengthened the fortifications of Corfu, turning it into an impregnable fortress. By the beginning of the siege of the fortress, it was armed with up to 650 fortress guns, a garrison of 3,000 people and a six-month supply of food. From the sea, the fortress was covered by two islands - Vido and Lazaretto; on the first of them there were powerful fortifications with a large number of artillery pieces.
In the twentieth of October, a detachment of captain 1st rank Selivachev approached Corfu, who, on the orders of Ushakov, began to implement the blockade. On November 9, Ushakov approached Corfu with the main forces. The squadron anchored south of the fortress. The allied fleet experienced an acute shortage of food. In addition, there were not enough landing troops to attack the fortress. The troops promised by Turkey did not arrive, and the receipt of reinforcements was delayed by lengthy negotiations.
Despite all the difficulties, Ushakov established a tight blockade of Corfu, depriving the French garrison of the opportunity to receive any outside help. In addition, in order to stop the French attempts to procure provisions for themselves by robbing local residents, a small landing force was landed on Corfu, and batteries were installed at the ends of the island. The battery, built on the northern side of the island, began systematic bombardment of French fortifications in November 1798.
On November 22, a schooner and two brigantines with food came to Ushakov from Sevastopol. On December 30, Rear Admiral Pustoshki arrived from Sevastopol with two new 74-gun ships. By January 1, 1799, Ushakov already had 12 ships, 11 frigates and several small vessels at his disposal. By January 25, additional forces arrived.
The entire period of the siege of the island of Corfu, which lasted three and a half months, was filled with numerous military clashes between the ships of the Russian squadron and the French ships stationed near the island. These ship duels, as well as systematic shelling of the fortress by Russian batteries, exhausted the enemy. However, a decisive assault on the fortress required coordinated action by all forces. Meanwhile, the Turkish command did not fulfill its supply obligations and delayed sending the promised landing force, which put Ushakov in a difficult position.
Despite this, Ushakov was actively preparing for the assault. Having studied the approaches to the island of Corfu, he made the correct conclusion that the sharp Vido serves as the key to the fortress. At the same time, he understood that it would be extremely difficult to take the heavily fortified island of Vido only by landing forces, but Ushakov was determined to take possession of it. The general signal for the assault on the island of Corfu was planned to be given simultaneously with the assault on the island of Vido. On the eve of the assault, a council of admirals and ship commanders was convened, at which Ushakov announced his decision and plan of action.
In preparation for the assault, Ushakov conducted a series of exercises, during which he paid special attention to the manufacture of siege ladders and fascines and the ability to use them. Much attention was also paid to communication issues, for which a table of 130 conventional flag signals was developed.
The attack on Vido Island began on February 18, 1799 at 7 am. The frigates, sailing, opened fire on the batteries and coastal structures of the island. This was followed by powerful fire on manpower and on the enemy’s coastal batteries and from the remaining ships that anchored according to the disposition. Several ships were assigned to a separate detachment with the task of shelling the raid and countering any supply of reinforcements to Vido Island. The same detachment was tasked with firing at enemy ships and frigates located on the western side of Vido Island.
Ushakov on the ship "St. Pavel, accompanied by the frigate, personally checked the correct placement of the ships according to the disposition, and then, approaching the distance of a grapeshot shot to the largest battery, together with the frigate, he destroyed it in a short time. By 11 o'clock the fire from enemy batteries had weakened significantly. The signal was raised on the flagship ship: “begin landing.” In total, more than 2,000 people were landed. The naval artillery fire continued during the landing. By 2 p.m., Vido Island was taken. Of the garrison, numbering up to 800 people, 422 people were captured.
At the same time, a general assault on the Corfu fortress began. The troops landed on the island immediately rushed to attack the outer defensive structures of the fortress. The first attack was repulsed, and only when reinforcements were received did the second attack end in success. The French commandant sent Ushakov a letter asking for a truce for 24 hours, during which he undertook to sign the surrender. The next day, on Ushakov’s ship “St. Paul”, the French General Chabot arrived and signed the terms of unconditional surrender.
The capture of the strongest naval fortress of Corfu by Ushakov was an unprecedented victory for that time. Ushakov again demonstrated high naval skill, and the Russian sailors showed excellent fighting qualities. The success of this battle was greatly facilitated by the fact that Ushakov, having correctly assessed the situation, decided to attack Vido Island first from the sea and then from land, although this contradicted outdated traditions, according to which the fleet can only block coastal fortresses.
During the siege and capture of the fortress of Corfu, Ushakov showed incomparably higher skill than the famous English admiral Nelson, who during the same period besieged the island of Malta and the much less strong fortress of La Valletta on it. If Ushakov needed only three months to capture Corfu, Nelson spent more than a year on the siege of Malta. At the same time, he himself did not wait for the capture of Malta, leaving for England.
Having received the news of Ushakov’s victory on the island of Corfu, Suvorov exclaimed: “Our Great Peter is alive! “, - that’s what we see now. Hooray! To the Russian Fleet!.. Now I say to myself: why wasn’t I at least a midshipman at Corfu?”
After the capture of the island of Corfu, the fighting of Ushakov's squadron was transferred to the coast of Southern Italy. Suvorov, the commander of the allied Russian-Austrian armies at that time, suggested that Ushakov send a detachment of ships to the Adriatic coast of Italy to blockade Ancona, since the French ships located there could intercept Austrian transport ships and thereby threaten communications important for Russia's ally, Austria. At the request of Suvorov, in May 1799, Ushakov sent 3 battleships (one Turkish), 4 frigates (2 Turkish) and 5 small ships to the shores of Ancona, entrusting the command of this detachment to Rear Admiral Pustoshkin. Somewhat earlier, another detachment was sent to Otranto under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Sorokin, which included 4 frigates, 2 light ships and 4 gunboats. On May 9, this detachment landed troops on the eastern coast of the Apennine Peninsula (between Brindisi and Manfredonia) under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Belli, who played an important role in the fighting of Russian troops in Italy. With a landing party, the number of which was increased to 600 people, Belli crossed the peninsula from east to west and, reaching the shore of the Tyrrhenian Sea (June 3, 1799), took part in the capture of Naples.
Ushakov at the end of June 1799 moved with the main forces of his squadron (10 battleships, 7 frigates and 5 other ships) to the shores of Sicily.
Having expelled the French from all of Northern Italy, Suvorov in early August 1799 began preparing for an attack on the Genoese Riviera. In terms of the attack on the Riviera, Suvorov devoted a significant place to the fleet. He wrote: “and the united fleet must be notified of our intentions and assist us both in covering water transport and in providing other assistance.”
While in Messina at the beginning of August, Ushakov received a letter from Suvorov, in which the field marshal asked to dispatch a group of ships to blockade Genoa in order to stop the supply of supplies to the French army by sea.
Ushakov urgently sent a detachment of two battleships and two frigates to Genoa under the command of Rear Admiral Pustoshkin, who had previously operated near Ancona. Sorokin was now sent to Naples. Pustoshkin's detachment assisted Suvorov until the very end of his stay in Italy.
On September 13 and 14, the great commander fought his famous crossing of Saint Gotthard and the Devil's Bridge. At this time, Ushakov’s squadron continued to remain in Italy, actively preparing for the campaign against Rome. Ushakov personally developed the plan for this campaign. He formed a detachment of 820 grenadiers and 200 sailors of the squadron under the command of Colonel Skipor. The detachment was assigned 2,500 people from the troops of the Neapolitan king. During the preparation for the campaign against Rome, the English Admiral Nelson arrived in Naples. Not wanting the Russians to take control of Rome, the English admiral secretly sent a warship to the port of Civita Vecchia (near Rome) with an offer to the French to capitulate before the Russians approached Rome. Nelson's terms of surrender were extremely favorable to the French. For example, weapons were not taken away from the French and they were not deprived of the right to conduct military operations again. The British promised to transport them to France on their ships. The French, naturally, agreed to such a “surrender,” especially since France could throw these troops against the allies on the Genoese coast. Ushakov was deeply outraged by this betrayal of the English admiral, but did not cancel the campaign against Rome. The solemn entry of Russian sailors into Rome, abandoned by the French under the terms of capitulation, ended the landing of the squadron in the campaign of 1799. In 1800, Ushakov’s squadron was recalled by Paul I to the Black Sea.
Ushakov's strategy and tactics were subordinated to one goal - the destruction of enemy forces. Like Suvorov, Ushakov was always looking for a decisive battle. This gave his tactics a pronounced offensive character, and Ushakov’s offensive maneuver tactics were more complete and richer than those of Western European admirals. Ushakov was never afraid to engage in battle with a numerically superior enemy. With all this, adventurism was alien to him, he never neglected caution.
Ushakov paid exceptional attention to the issues of combat training of the squadron. Intense combat training in both peacetime and war was the style of the admiral's daily work. In the most difficult days preceding the Battle of Kerch, Ushakov did not interrupt his studies on the squadron and in his order dated July 5, 1790, he gave specific instructions to ship commanders on training gunners. The order spoke of the need to conduct daily rapid-fire exercises from cannons and practice aiming guns, for which it was proposed to attach three gunners to each cannon, changing them to perform duties one by one. On each ship, the commanders were required to arrange a personal examination for the gunners. To sum up the results of the artillery preparation, Ushakov planned to conduct a general training exercise for the entire squadron with shooting.
Ushakov achieved great success in organizing vigilant service on ships and in coastal fortresses, for which he widely used Peter’s traditions - the exchange of conditioned signals when ships met at sea and when ships approached fortresses. Ushakov paid a lot of attention to organizing reconnaissance in the theater and studying the enemy.
The flourishing of naval art in Russia in the second half of the 18th century naturally coincided with the flourishing of all Russian military art during this period. From the moment of the organization of the regular army and navy under Peter I, the development of military art went in parallel with the naval art, expressing the growth of the regular armed force of the Russian state. In this situation, Ushakov showed a correct understanding of the importance of the fleet for Russia and its place in the system of armed forces.
This allowed Ushakov to become a great master of organizing interaction between the fleet and ground forces. Ushakov attached particular importance to the organization of regular formations of ground forces (marines) within the fleet. Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov devoted his entire life to the fleet. If, thanks to Rumyantsev and especially Suvorov, the Russian army not only preserved its glorious military traditions, but also significantly increased them, then in the navy this merit belonged to Ushakov.
Ushakov did not lose a single naval battle, and he considered the main factor in his victories, first of all, the stamina and courage of the sailors of the squadron. Ushakov himself tirelessly took care of the team and often, during periods of interruptions in the squadron’s supply, spent his personal funds on food and the needs of the team. A humane attitude towards the sailor and a well-thought-out system for educating squadron personnel largely brought Ushakov in common with Suvorov. Ushakov, like Suvorov, highly valued the moral qualities of Russian soldiers.
The Suvorov and Ushakov principles of education and training of army and navy personnel at that time found a certain support only among the most far-sighted representatives of the highest court nobility, such as, for example, Rumyantsev and Potemkin. They understood perfectly well that to fight external enemies they needed a strong army, which could not rely on stick drill alone. Potemkin and his like-minded people understood that only an authoritative commander could confidently lead personnel into battle. Such a commander in the fleet was F.F. Ushakov, who had enormous authority and earned the boundless trust and devotion of the squadron personnel.
A description of the naval leadership activities of Admiral Ushakov would be incomplete without mentioning his diplomatic abilities and political outlook, which he showed with particular force in the period 1798-1800.
Ushakov’s activities in the Mediterranean were greatly complicated by the hostile attitude towards him on the part of the commander of the “allied” English squadron, Admiral Nelson. The latter sought to distract the Russians from Malta and the Adriatic Sea and send the Russian squadron to the Levant, thereby ensuring freedom of action against Malta and preventing the Russians from gaining a foothold in the Ionian archipelago. Nelson hoped in this way to free up the English forces operating in the Levant and direct them to strengthen the Maltese direction, which was more important for England during this period. Nelson tried to use any dishonest means to do this. On the one hand, he flattered Emperor Paul I as the “Grand Master of the Order of Malta” and sent him honorary reports and gifts. On the other hand, he constantly demanded that the commanders of his ships not allow the raising of the Russian flag in Malta under any circumstances, and tried to arouse distrust of the Russians on the part of the Turkish admiral, who acted together with Ushakov.
Ushakov did not succumb to the cunning tricks of the English admiral; he boldly and honestly expressed his disagreement to him and pursued a firm and consistent line aimed at protecting Russia’s interests in the Mediterranean.
Ushakov's naval art could have received even greater development if not for numerous intrigues on the part of individual officials and soulless representatives of the bureaucratic autocratic regime.
Upon returning to his homeland, Ushakov did not receive real recognition from the tsar and the government. At the beginning of 1802, he was appointed commander of the Baltic galley fleet, which essentially meant the removal of the famous naval commander from military affairs, since the importance of the galley fleet at that time became secondary. In 1807, Ushakov was completely dismissed, and ten years later, on October 4, 1817, he died at his estate in the Temnikovsky district of the Tambov province.
But Ushakov was not forgotten by the Russian people and the Russian fleet. His tactical skill found further development in the combat activities of Ushakov’s closest student and ally, Admiral Dmitry Nikolaevich Senyavin, and through him became the property of the “Lazarev School” and the famous Russian admirals of the later period of development of the Russian fleet.
The memory of the naval commander is carefully preserved by the Russian people. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated March 3, 1944, the Order and Medal of Ushakov were established, which were awarded to many officers and sailors of the Soviet Navy who distinguished themselves during the Great Patriotic War in battles against the Nazi invaders.

NAVAL ART OF ADMIRAL F. F. USHAKOV Candidate of Naval Sciences Captain 1st Rank R. N. MORDVINOV

INTRODUCTION

The scientific and technical process, determined largely by the political and economic aspirations of states, the improvement and use of new combat weapons of the fleet causes changes in the tactics of naval combat.

Thus, during the period of the slave system, the fleet consisted of flat-bottomed wooden ships, mainly rowing. A straight sail was used only when the wind was fair. Poor seaworthiness and lack of navigational instruments forced people to limit themselves to coastal navigation.

In battle, the ships tried to come close together in order to grapple side to side - to board them - and fight hand-to-hand with weapons no different from land weapons. Another way to achieve victory in battle was to hit it with a ram - a strong protrusion in the bow of the underwater part of the ship. The fleet, which included more maneuverable ships, aimed at ramming operations, while those with more trained warriors aimed at boarding combat.

Experience in shipbuilding and naval art slowly accumulated in the Middle Ages, until, finally, the development of bourgeois relations in Europe pushed a number of states to equip sea expeditions to search for new lands. The era of great geographical discoveries begins. More advanced vessels were required to capture colonies. Large keel ships with good seaworthiness appear in the fleets. The main propulsion device of the ship was the sail; the compass was introduced into use; Firearms and artillery appeared in the arsenal of ships (XV century). The struggle of states for colonies, markets and sea trade routes began. The wars of this period are characterized by the increased role of fleets and the expansion of their areas of operation, the creation of special warships and their consolidation into squadrons and fleets; the idea arose of solving diverse military-political problems at sea through general battles with the goal of defeating the enemy fleet. In naval combat tactics, the formation of a wake column (line) was considered a firmly established battle formation. Linear tactics were explained by the technical data of the ship, the weapons of that time, and lasted almost 200 years.

At the end of the 18th century. In the fleets, a transition began from linear to maneuverable tactics, which had a pronounced offensive character, was distinguished by a variety of tactical methods of combat and great determination.

Outstanding examples of the development and successful application of these tactics were the brilliant victories won by the Russian Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral F.F. Ushakov over the superior forces of the Turkish fleet in the Tendra (1790) and Kaliakra (1791) battles, during the capture of the strongest French naval fortress of Corfu on the Mediterranean Sea (1799).

By the middle of the 19th century. profound changes were taking place in the ships: the sail was gradually replaced by a steam engine, rifled artillery was greatly developed, the need arose to armor ships, and mines and torpedoes appeared in the arsenal of fleets. The balance of forces began to be determined by the number of not only battleships, but also cruisers, destroyers and other new classes of warships.

New naval theories are emerging, the tactics of naval combat are changing significantly, which was influenced by the long-term struggle between artillery and armor. The most outstanding naval commander of the Russian armored fleet of this period was Admiral G.I. Butakov. His work “New Foundations of Steamship Tactics” G.I. Butakov published in 1863.

At the end of the 19th century. The rapid improvement of naval artillery, improvements in the quality of armor and progress in the field of military shipbuilding determined the appearance of warships and the methods of their use. A naval battle, according to theorists of those years, was primarily an artillery-ramming competition between armored squadrons, in which a certain role was assigned to a self-propelled mine (torpedo). The idea of ​​a general battle focused on different points of view on naval combat as a forced means to achieve a particular strategic goal. In 1897, Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov published a fundamental work, “Reflections on the Issues of Naval Tactics,” in which for the first time naval tactics was defined as the science of naval combat, exploring the elements that make up the strength of ships and the ways of their most advantageous use in war.

After the Russo-Japanese War, naval tactics did not have systematic definitions, but its content and essence remained the same. The main types of combat activity of the fleet were, as before, recognized as actions of the fleet against the fleet and actions of the fleet against the shore.

The armed struggle at sea during the First World War marked the beginning of a new period in the development of naval art. Changes in naval tactics became especially noticeable. The era of the operation of heterogeneous naval forces has arrived. In addition to surface ships, submarines and then aircraft began to be used. The battle formations became deeper. Artillery competitions between armored squadrons, combined with attacks by torpedo forces, gradually transformed into complex battles involving heterogeneous forces, which significantly increased the role of tactical interaction.

The types of combat operations of the fleets became more clearly defined: the actions of the fleet against the fleet were expressed in naval battles and battles to destroy the enemy, in the fight on sea communications, as well as in mine and artillery positions; naval actions against the coast - in assisting ground forces, amphibious landings and actions against enemy bases and ports.

All the most important changes in the principles of training and conducting naval combat in World War II were the result of changes in the means of combat at sea. In naval battles, diverse naval forces began to be used, all classes of large surface ships, deck- and shore-based aircraft, and submarines. In the coastal zone, torpedo boats, coastal artillery and mines were used. Radio communications, radar and hydroacoustics have received the most active development and application. During the war, there was a redistribution of the role of various types of naval forces in the destruction of the enemy fleet.

Thus, aviation turned from an auxiliary force into the main strike force. Many battles, especially in ocean theaters, began and ended without the use of artillery or torpedo weapons at all. In World War II, submarines became part of general battle formations and began to be used to carry out preliminary strikes and reconnaissance. Okies turned out to be the most effective type of force when operating against enemy ships on sea lanes. Naval battles of this period were characterized by great depth: vast areas of the ocean were covered, and with the increased mobility of formations, the duration of the battle increased.

New possibilities for detecting the enemy, observing him, and the increased power of tactical strikes influenced the methods of action in each type of naval combat. The theory and practice of amphibious and anti-landing operations, as well as the destruction of enemy fleet forces in bases and the destruction of coastal facilities, have received significant development.

The Second World War did not lead to a general cessation of wars, but only marked a new redistribution of the world. With the advent of nuclear weapons, none of the world's leading states could any longer count on victory in open combat - but this only stimulated the goal of new peripheral conflicts in the second half of the 20th century. Local wars and armed conflicts influenced the construction and organizational structure of military fleets. Their experience contributed to the choice of directions in which the development and improvement of weapons and military equipment took place:

Universalization of fleet equipment and weapons, taking into account the possibility of conducting combat operations in various geographical conditions;

Improving the quality of weapons in order to increase their combat effectiveness and improve the methods of their use;

Creation and development of means for automating force control during combat operations.

Naval forces, as a rule, were used with complete dominance of the attacking side at sea and in the air, in close cooperation with other branches of the Armed Forces by conducting joint operations and organizing combat operations simultaneously in all areas. The main forms of use of the Navy were operations, systematic combat operations and naval battles. The emergence of fundamentally new means (jet aircraft, helicopters, nuclear submarines and surface ships, hovercraft, etc.), weapons and military equipment (missiles of various types, new radio-electronic equipment, unified integrated systems for surveillance, control and target designation, etc. ) could not but affect the nature of the combat operations of the fleets, could not but cause a re-evaluation of the various types of forces, the combat means of the fleet and, of course, the improvement of the forms and methods of their use.

The further rapid development of fleet tactics, based on the history of naval art, will continue to depend on scientific and technological progress, experience in the combat use of weapons and equipment, initiative and creativity of commanders of ships (units) and naval formations.

The Navy is the main component and basis of the maritime potential of the Russian state, a branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, designed to ensure the protection of the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean by military methods, maintaining military-political stability in the adjacent seas, military security with sea ​​and ocean directions.

The Navy is one of the instruments of the state's foreign policy. This is an independent, most technically complex and knowledge-intensive branch of the Armed Forces.

The main tasks of the Navy:

Deterrence from the use of military force or the threat of its use against the Russian Federation and its allies from sea and ocean directions, including participation in strategic nuclear deterrence;

Protecting the interests of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean by military methods;

Maintaining the naval potential of the Russian Federation in readiness for use as intended;

Control of the activities of the naval forces of foreign states and military-political blocs in the seas adjacent to the country’s territory, as well as in other areas of the World Ocean that are important for the security of the Russian Federation;

Identification, warning and prevention of military threats, repelling aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies from sea and ocean directions, participation in actions to prevent and localize armed conflicts in the early stages of their development;

Timely build-up of forces and assets in areas of the World Ocean from which a threat to the interests and security of the Russian Federation may come;

-. ensuring the protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the underwater environment;

Equipment of the waters of the World Ocean and the coastal zone of the Russian Federation as a possible area of ​​military action;

Creating and maintaining conditions for the safety of economic and other activities of the Russian Federation in its territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, on the continental shelf, as well as in remote areas of the World Ocean;

Ensuring the naval presence of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean, demonstrating the flag and military power of the Russian state, exchanging visits of ships and vessels of the Navy, participating in military, peacekeeping and humanitarian actions carried out by the world community that meet the interests of the Russian Federation;

Participation in oceanographic, hydrometeorological, cartographic, search and rescue support for the activities of relevant government bodies and other organizations;

Ensuring navigational safety of navigation;

Implementation of the achieved bilateral and multilateral agreements between states to expand trust and prevent incidents at sea, exchange information, create collective security bodies, reduce (limit) naval forces and weapons and limit military activities in mutually agreed upon areas.

Composition and organization of the Navy

The purpose and nature of the activities of the Navy require the presence in its composition of various types of forces capable of solving both offensive and defensive tasks in remote and coastal areas.

The Navy consists of two components: maritime strategic nuclear forces (NSNF), general purpose maritime forces (MPF), as well as support forces, special forces and fleet services.

The Navy includes four branches of forces: submarine forces; surface forces; naval aviation; Coastal troops of the Navy.

A branch of force is an integral part of a branch of the Armed Forces, including units and formations that have their own combat assets, weapons and equipment. Each type of force has its own characteristic combat properties, uses its own tactics and is intended to solve operational, tactical, operational-tactical tasks. Branches of forces, as a rule, operate in a certain geographical environment and are capable of conducting combat operations independently and jointly with other branches of forces.

In modern conditions, the main branches of the Navy, capable of most successfully solving the main offensive missions of the fleet using conventional and nuclear missile weapons, are submarine forces and naval aviation.

Naval strategic nuclear forces are an integral part of the country's strategic nuclear forces. They are represented by strategic missile submarines (rplSN) and are used in the operations of strategic nuclear forces according to the plan of the Supreme High Command.

General-purpose naval forces include all branches of the Navy and are used to solve operational and tactical tasks and conduct systematic combat operations.

Coastal troops as a branch of the Navy unites formations and units of the Marine Corps, coastal missile and artillery troops (BRAV), and in certain regions of the Russian Federation and groups of coastal troops (coastal defense troops).

Support forces, special troops and naval services include naval air defense forces, formations and units of special troops and services (intelligence, naval engineering, chemical, communications, radio engineering, electronic warfare, missile technology, technical support, search and rescue, hydrographic), formations, units and institutions of the rear. The composition of the Russian Navy is shown in Fig. 2.

Organizationally, the Navy of the Russian Federation consists of associations, naval bases, individual formations, units and institutions.

The Russian Navy is headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, who is one of the Deputy Ministers of Defense. The highest body of the Navy - the Main Headquarters of the Navy and the Directorate of the Navy - is subordinate to him.

A formation is a large organizational formation consisting of formations and units of various branches of the Navy, capable of independently or in cooperation with other types of armed forces solving operational (sometimes strategic) tasks. Depending on the composition and scale of the tasks of the association, they can be operational-strategic, operational and operational-tactical.

The regionally deployed operational-strategic formations of the Russian Navy include: the Northern, Pacific, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, as well as the Caspian flotilla. The basis of the Northern and Pacific fleets are strategic missile submarines and multi-purpose nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, landing and multi-purpose surface ships, mine-sweeping ships and boats, diesel submarines, coastal missile and artillery troops and attack aircraft. The basis of the Baltic, Black Sea fleets and the Caspian flotilla are multi-purpose surface ships, mine-sweeping ships and boats, diesel submarines, coastal missile and artillery troops and attack aircraft.

The operational formations of the Navy include flotillas(flotilla of heterogeneous forces, flotilla of strategic submarines, flotilla of attack submarines) and naval air force.

The operational-tactical formations of the Navy include squadrons (operational squadron, squadron of heterogeneous forces, squadron of attack submarines, squadron of amphibious assault forces).

The regional deployment of the Navy requires the maintenance and development of independent basing infrastructures, shipbuilding and ship repair, all types of support, the basis of which is the historically developed system of cities - naval bases in Russia.

A naval base (naval base) is an equipped and defended coastal area with the adjacent water area, providing basing, comprehensive support, deployment and return of fleet forces. As a rule, it includes several bases, as well as forces and means to maintain a favorable operational regime in the assigned 8MB operational area of ​​responsibility.

The composition of formations and naval bases is not constant. It is determined depending on the purpose, the nature of the tasks performed, the areas and directions in which they operate, as well as the conditions of the theater of military operations.

A formation is a permanent organizational formation of ships and units capable of independently solving tactical problems and participating in solving operational problems. The composition of connections is determined by their standard structure. Designed for purposeful combat training and ease of control. The division is the main tactical formation. Brigade and division ships - tactical formations.

A division (brigade) of submarines consists, as a rule, of submarines of the same class (subclass). For example: a division of strategic missile submarines, a division (brigade) of torpedo submarines. Divisions (brigades) of surface ships consist of one or more classes (subclasses) of ships. For example: a division of missile and artillery ships. The division as a tactical formation is a formation of ships of rank 111 and IV. For example: a minesweeper division, a missile boat division, etc.

A tactical unit is a military formation capable of independently solving tactical problems. The units are: ships of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd rank, groups of ships of the 4th rank, a regiment (in naval aviation, marine corps, BRAV).

The part, in turn, consists of military units - small military formations. Typical units: combat unit (service), 4th rank ship, squadron, air unit, battalion, company, platoon, etc.

Special troops and services intended to support the combat activities of the Navy and solve their inherent special tasks are organized organizationally into formations, units, divisions and institutions that are part of the formations, formations and units of the Navy, and are also under central subordination. For example: a division of reconnaissance ships, a military construction detachment, a chemical defense battalion, a communications center, a radio engineering company, an electronic warfare squadron, an arsenal, bases and warehouses, a ship repair yard, a rescue ship brigade, a hydrographic detachment, an automobile company, a group of sea support vessels, etc. .

The organizational structure of the Russian Navy is shown in Fig. 3.

The qualitative and quantitative composition of troops (forces) of fleets (flotillas) must correspond to the level and nature of threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in a particular region.

The variety of tasks solved by the fleet necessitates the specialization of ships, i.e. the construction of ships with certain qualities, which led to the need to classify them.

All ships and vessels in the Navy are divided into groups. The criterion for division is purpose. There are five groups: warships, combat boats, special purpose ships, sea support vessels, raid ships and support boats.

Warships and combat boats, i.e. the first and second groups determine the combat strength of the Navy and are intended to solve combat missions specifically.

The group of special purpose ships includes special purpose submarines, control ships, training ships, and reconnaissance ships.

The group of maritime support vessels includes vessels providing combat training, medical support, radiation safety and chemical protection, transport, emergency rescue, navigation and hydrographic support.

The group of raid support vessels includes vessels designed to support fleet activities in roadsteads and harbors. To them from-; Basic rescue vessels, self-propelled and non-self-propelled maintenance vessels, basic dry cargo and liquid vessels, tugboats, raid boats, etc. are carried.

Within groups, ships and vessels of the Navy are divided into classes. The criteria for dividing into classes are the tasks to be solved and the main weapon. For example, submarines are divided into two classes, and surface ships into five classes.

Within classes, combat ships and special purpose ships are divided into subclasses. The criteria for dividing into subclasses are displacement, type of power plant, narrower specialization, cruising range.

Depending on the tactical and technical elements and purpose, as well as to determine the seniority of commanders, the legal status of the officers and the standards of logistics, warships are divided into ranks. There are four ranks of ships in the Russian Navy. The first is the highest. The division into classes and ranks is determined by the Regulations on the classification of ships and vessels of the Navy.

6 depending on the design features of ships of one And of the same subclass also differ in types and designs.

The classification of ship personnel in different countries has its own characteristics and is not constant. As the fleet develops, with changes in its missions and ship armament, new classes (subclasses) appear, and obsolete ones are excluded from the fleet. Thus, after World War II, most states excluded the class of battleships and subclasses of convoy aircraft carriers from the fleet, and the subclass of patrol ships was excluded from the US Navy. With the equipping of the fleet with missile weapons, a class of missile ships appeared.

The future of the fleet lies in multi-purpose, universal ships capable of effectively combating air, surface, underwater and coastal targets. Therefore, the number of ship classes will be reduced. At the same time, there are specific tasks that require the use of special materials and design solutions in the construction of ships, for example, mine ladders, landing ships, and some special-purpose ships, the universalization of which is impractical.

Basic forms of combat

It is possible to destroy the enemy or suppress him to such an extent that he cannot effectively counteract our forces only with weapons.

By the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, the main tactical forms of using naval forces became systematic combat operations, battles (sea, air, anti-aircraft), strikes, attacks, search, tracking, pursuit, mine laying and mine action. They are an integral part of a battle, naval operation, naval operation or flotilla of heterogeneous forces. Naval combat became the basis of fleet and flotilla operations. When conducting military operations, fights, strikes and attacks may occur.

An attack is a combination of rapid maneuver with decisive use of weapons and electronic warfare equipment against the enemy in order to destroy him. It is carried out by single ships, aircraft (helicopters), their strike and tactical groups, independently or jointly with each other, against enemy sea or coastal targets with the aim of their destruction (destruction). Joint attacks are carried out sequentially or simultaneously from one or more directions. Depending on the type of weapon used, the attack can be missile, torpedo, artillery, depth charges, or a combination.

Maneuver during an attack is carried out in order to quickly occupy an advantageous position for the effective use of weapons. Thus, on the night of October 16, 1973, a mixed tactical group of Israeli ships (three missile boats and one torpedo boat) discovered two Egyptian boats in the Aboukir Bay area. In the process of approaching them, the Israelis were subjected to an advanced attack by the enemy, who promptly took advantage of their advantages in firing range. With a salvo of five missiles, the Egyptians sank one torpedo boat and two missile boats. As the Egyptian command stated, this was the most successful attack by their naval forces during the entire period of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

Counterattack is a counter attack by the defending side against the attacking enemy forces. Example: torpedo attack by a submarine during evasion (separation) from an enemy naval search and strike group.

Maneuver in naval combat

Modern naval combat, taking place in various environments: above water, under water and in the air, is of a combined nature. It can take place in large areas of the ocean and in a limited coastal area of ​​the sea with the participation of both individual ships, groups, detachments, and operational-tactical formations of heterogeneous fleet forces, according to a single concept and plan. Success in battle largely depends on successful maneuver of forces, clear coordination of their actions in terms of target, place and time, skillful combination of types of weapons, camouflage means, and electronic warfare.

The content of the maneuver includes the organized movement of forces and means during combat operations, their redirection to a new direction (line, to the area) to occupy an advantageous position in relation to the enemy and concentrate the necessary grouping of forces (fire weapons) in the direction of the main attack, evading attacks enemy and the effective use of weapons in carrying out assigned or newly emerging tasks. In other words, maneuver in combat is the purposeful movement of fire weapons of opposing forces, including such forms as approaching, retreating, evading, changing positions, bypassing, enveloping, etc., carried out to achieve success with less force and cost. It includes not only the organized movement of forces, but also the transfer of fire, the movement of materiel (maneuver by fire, materiel), etc.

The maneuver is based on the secrecy and speed of movement of ships for the purpose of sudden and massive concentration of forces and assets in decisive directions. If these requirements are not met, the goals set are usually not achieved.

Maneuver at sea corresponds to the desire of the attacking side to take an advantageous position in relation to the enemy, to use his weaknesses, the current situation, which is characteristic of naval battles and battles from the moment of their inception.

The pioneer of the art of maneuver in naval combat was Admiral F.F. Ushakov. His tactics did not exclude battle lines as one of the elements of the battle order. They were only the basis for the construction of ships, which actively maneuvered during the battle. Breaking the established canonical traditions, he subordinated the linear formation of naval forces to maneuver. The immutable rule of Ushakov’s tactics was maneuver in combination with fire. Thus, in the battle at Cape Kaliakria (July 31, 1791), he undertook an unexpected maneuver, attacking enemy ships anchored from the shore. The enemy fleet, which weighed anchor in disarray, after a four-hour battle, was completely defeated and fled to the Bosporus, losing several ships along the way that sank from holes. Russian losses amounted to 17 killed and 28 wounded.

A great contribution to the development of maneuverable naval combat tactics was made by the students and followers of Admiral F.F. Ushakov: D.N. Senyavin, P.S. Nakhimov, G.I. Butakov, S.O. Makarov and others. Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov wrote: “Success in naval combat will largely depend on skillful control of the ship, and it is necessary to find all sorts of means to accustom the personnel to maneuvering the ship."

The history of armed struggle at sea has confirmed that victory, even over an enemy superior in numbers, was usually won by those forces that in battle skillfully combined speed and maneuver, activity and calculation, stealth and surprise. A classic example of the use of potential maneuver capabilities is the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor. Their highly maneuverable forces, covertly and in a short time covering a long distance, struck a blow, as a result of which significant forces of the American fleet were sunk and disabled (8 battleships, 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 4 auxiliary ships, over 300 aircraft, more than 3 thousand ships). personnel). Japanese losses amounted to 28 aircraft shot down and 74 damaged. Thus, thanks to skillful maneuver, great damage was inflicted on the enemy and strategic objectives were solved for a certain period of the war. The basis for success was the effective use of a highly mobile strike force.

There are many examples of the Great Patriotic War, when maneuver was the decisive factor in victory.

On August 19, 1944, in the area of ​​​​Cape Kiebergnes, 14 torpedo boats of the Northern Fleet entered into battle with a German convoy, numbering 30 pennants (almost half were escort ships). The forces were clearly unequal, but the boatmen achieved a decisive victory. 17 units from the enemy convoy were sunk and damaged. The success was largely facilitated by the bold and daring maneuver of two boats (commanded by senior lieutenants V. Domyslovsky and V. Bykov), who managed to get close to the convoy under continuous fire from the Nazis and, passing along the formation, put up a smoke screen so that it deprived the enemy of the possibility of observation, maneuvering and conducting aimed fire.

In the post-war years, the tactics of naval combat changed significantly: it can be deployed over large areas, is characterized by more decisive goals, high activity of the opposing sides, a variety of tactics, high effectiveness, widespread use of electronic warfare equipment, and sharp and rapid changes in the situation. Therefore, an important criterion for the effectiveness of naval combat and a necessary condition for achieving its goals are the high-quality preparation of forces for rapid maneuver and its skillful and timely implementation. To successfully conduct a maneuver, it requires compliance with the general plan of the battle and the current situation, ease of execution, secrecy and speed of execution, allocation of sufficient forces and means and their reliable cover, carefully organized and continuous interaction of all forces participating in the maneuver, constant and reliable control of forces. Much of success depends on the level of combat skill, tactical and naval training, and the moral, psychological and physical condition of the personnel. All these factors are interconnected and have a direct impact on the final results.

Compliance of the maneuver with the general plan of the battle and the current situation, simplicity of its execution. First of all, the commander must correctly understand the task, deeply assess the situation, and be able to foresee the course of events. The experience of the Great Patriotic War and the practice of bilateral exercises conducted in navies have shown that any maneuver or tactical technique can become lifeless and doomed to failure if it is used thoughtlessly, without taking into account the specific situation, and without sufficient comprehensive preparedness. Adjustment or (if necessary) change of decision is an important component of the work of the commander and his staff during the preparation for and conduct of combat operations. In modern naval combat, in a rapidly changing environment, with a strict time limit, a maneuver is the embodiment of reasonable initiative, a clear understanding of the task, and an indicator of the tactical skill of the command level. The ship's charter requires the commander to be able to make decisions leading to achieving a common goal and completing the assigned task. The simplicity of the plan ensures the speed and reliability of its implementation and accompanies success. But it has nothing to do with stubborn straightforwardness, ingenuousness and implies the exclusion of far-fetched difficulties, artificial difficulties, to overcome which will require a useless expenditure of effort, energy and time. The ship's commander must control the ship boldly, energetically and decisively, without fear of responsibility for a risky maneuver dictated by the situation.

Stealth and speed of maneuver. As the experience of combat operations at sea shows, secrecy is the main factor ensuring surprise. It is based on tactical camouflage and mobility of forces both at the deployment stage and during the direct use of weapons.

Concealment of maneuver during combat operations involves the implementation of a whole complex of technical and tactical measures aimed at reducing or weakening the unmasking signs of ships, improving the organization of command and control of forces and methods of their use. The secrecy and surprise of a maneuver can be achieved primarily by keeping its plan secret, misinforming the enemy by carrying out false measures, and constantly combating his reconnaissance and electronic warfare means. The timeliness of the maneuver will depend on the speed of its implementation, which is achieved by organizing it in a short time, the simplicity of the plan, and the high rate of shifting forces to new positions and frontiers. In addition, to achieve surprise, well-organized and targeted tactical training, competent use of technical means, clear organization of service, high discipline and vigilance are required.

Thus, the secrecy of the preparations, combined with a thorough reconnaissance of the base defense system and the disposition of ships, allowed the forces of the English fleet to make an unexpected maneuver and strike the main forces of the Italian fleet on November 11-12, 1940 in the Mediterranean base of Taranto. The main blow was delivered by a small force of torpedo bombers (11 units), while the remaining fleet forces carried out the support task. As a result of the sudden attack, three of the six battleships (Conte di Cavour, Cayo Duilio, Littorio) were seriously damaged and were out of action for a long time. In addition, two heavy cruisers were damaged by bombs. Overall, the Italian fleet suffered heavy losses. British losses amounted to 2 aircraft. The success of the strike was due to the carelessness and low vigilance of the command of the Italian fleet. The planes of the first wave were discovered by the Italians only when they were already above the ships. The ships stationed at the base did not have reliable cover and V did not change their disposition for a long time.

In recent years, the requirements for secrecy of maneuver have increased significantly, which was a consequence of a significant expansion of reconnaissance capabilities, monitoring of air, underwater and surface conditions, the adoption of reconnaissance and strike systems, and the use of homing high-precision weapons. Stealth is ensured if all camouflage requirements are met and speed and coordination of crew actions are achieved.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3/2005, pp. 47-51

Captain 1st rankO. K. SACKS ,

Doctor of Military Sciences

Retired captain 1st rankV. I. POLENIN ,

Doctor of Military Sciences

The TARGET of the Organizational and Mobilization Collection of the Navy (2004) indicates the need to develop a “theory of forms of use of Navy forces,” which characterizes the modern focus of the efforts of naval theory and determines the relevance of these issues. Their main content, in our opinion, is the rationale for the proposals:

on structuring the forms of use of naval forces in accordance with the principles of standardization and unification;

to introduce the category “operation” as the generalized highest form of use of naval forces at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical) and eliminate the shortcomings of existing definitions of operations and combat operations;

to bring the terminology associated with defining the forms of use of naval forces in accordance with the true content of these concepts.

Structuring the forms of use of naval forces must comply with the principles of standardization and unification, which, according to the provisions of the systems approach, any system that claims to be recognized as perfection, necessity and sufficiency must satisfy. In the current version of the Navy's Battle Manual, the system of forms of use of forces is, according to our estimates, partly redundant and partly incomplete system with insufficiently ordered connections in terms of subordination and equivalence of forms, their roles as system-forming and additional. In particular, the following take place flaws.

First. Among the main independent forms of operations and combat operations is mentioned hit as a single-level form equal to them, although in meaning hit is a subordinate form, since it is carried out (applied, carried out) only within the framework of operations and combat operations.

Second. The instruction to carry out fleet operations and combat operations in tactical forms is a violation of the principle of subordination. Their implementation should be determined only through the actions of subordinate associations.

Third. The instruction on the implementation of combat operations of fleet formations through the combat operations of subordinate formations reflects the currently non-existent three-tier naval structure “fleet - association - association”, since in reality there is a hierarchy of “fleet - association - association”.

Fourth. At the tactical level there are no logically justifiable tactical operations, and for peacetime - special And peacekeeping operations. An objection might be that special operations and peacekeeping operations belong to the operational level. However, this objection cannot be accepted, since there is a precedent for extending the same form of “combat operations” to both the operational and tactical levels.

Fifth. Combat is realized in blows, attacks and maneuvers as subordinate forms, expressing itself through these forms in its phases. This is correct, but that is precisely why these particular forms are not single-level forms, equal in rights to combat, as follows from their lists without indicating subordination.

If all the noted shortcomings are eliminated, then the final diagram of the system of forms of use of naval forces will take the form presented in the table.

The proposed final system of forms of use of naval forces is characterized by the following indicators and features.

Firstly, completeness, namely the presence of operations and actions as the main system-forming forms at all levels - strategic, operational and tactical - for war and peacetime (new forms are tactical, special And peacekeeping operations).

Secondly, a clear division of the initial forms into system-forming ones, subordinate in the hierarchy (operations and combat actions of various levels) and additional subordinate forms.

Thirdly, strict subordination, i.e. the use by the main, system-forming forms for their implementation only of subordinate forms of the next hierarchical level (this is how operations and combat actions of the fleet, operational commands of the Armed Forces (OCVS) and subordinate formations are formed).

Fourthly, the introduction of an internal two-level structure of operational level forms in strict accordance with the definitions of operations and combat operations of the fleet (operational-strategic level), naval operations, as well as operations and combat actions of formations (operational-tactical level).

Peacetime special operations should be considered primarily operations on a tactical scale. This is an additional argument in favor of introducing the concept "tactical operation" since such an introduction automatically ensures the unity of forms of war and peacetime.

Deficiencies in the definitions of operations and combat operations. Obviously, the proposal to introduce the concept of “tactical operation” is legitimate to discuss if an acceptable definition of this form of use of force is given. Using currently accepted terms, the following could be given: approximate definition of a tactical operation: “A tactical operation is a set of battles, strikes and attacks of heterogeneous or homogeneous forces and naval forces, coordinated and interconnected in purpose, mission, place and time, acting according to a single concept and plan to carry out the most important tactical (combat) missions.” However, this standard definition will, in our opinion, be unsatisfactory, since it does not meet the requirement of disclosing the essence and characteristics of this particular form of the use of forces relative to other forms. This can be seen from a comparison of the definitions of operations and combat actions of various scales, where the differences between operations and combat actions are of a secondary, illusory nature. Thus, the operation and the combat actions of the fleet, having the same operational scale, differ only simultaneity And operational-strategic scale- for fleet operations, sequence And operational-tactical scale- for naval combat operations. Considering that simultaneity And subsequence are signs not of a form, but of a method of performing tasks, it becomes clear that the above formulations repeat each other and practically define the same form of use of forces.

Thus, in their meaning we consider these definitions to be purely declarative and not normative. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the terminology associated with defining the forms of use of naval forces into accordance with the true content of these concepts.

There is a well-known principle according to which the level of opposing factions must be commensurate. For example, groupings at the operational level must be opposed by groups at the same level. This principle is universal, therefore it can and should be applied to determining the characteristics of the forms of use of force.

At the operational level, a modern adversary is capable of conducting military operations characterized by the simultaneous actions of all groupings of forces and the constant creation of a threat in all environments throughout the entire depth of the operational zones of the fleets. Countering such an enemy requires the formation of a special response process for the operational use of forces, which has similar fundamental properties: simultaneity, multi-medium, spatial scope And continuity of action. It is obvious that the organizational form of the use of forces, which allows for the implementation of all of the specified properties, will be precisely an operation, i.e., a fleet operation is the highest form of organizing the process of operational use of fleet forces in the performance of operational-strategic and operational tasks, when the creation of properties is ensured simultaneity, multi-medium, spatial scope and continuity of actions of forces in the operational zone of the fleet, as well as the ability of headquarters to continuously respond to changes in the situation, manage forces and ensure their actions for the duration of tasks or until the achievement of action goals.

Otherwise, only combat operations can be carried out as a form of organizing the process of operational use of fleet forces with incomplete creation (presence) of the properties inherent in the operation for forces and (or) headquarters. And nothing more! Everything here is necessary and sufficient.

The practical significance of the definitions we propose, along with their exact correspondence to the true meaning of the term “form of the use of forces,” consists of a normative, active nature that directs the thinking and will of military leaders and staffs to a clear definition of the ability and necessary conditions for performing assigned tasks in one form or another of the use of forces. If this is understood and accepted, then the definitions of other forms of use of force at all levels should be revised in the same spirit. If we return to the tactical level under discussion, then in terms corresponding to the etymology of the term “form”, the definitions of a tactical operation and tactical (combat) actions will be as follows.

Tactical operation- the highest form of organization of the process of using forces in carrying out assigned tactical tasks, ensuring simultaneity, multi-medium, spatial scope and continuity of actions of forces in a designated zone (area) and the ability of headquarters to continuously respond to changes in the situation, manage forces and ensure their actions for the duration of tasks or until action goals are achieved.

Tactical (combat) actions- a form of organizing the process of tactical use of forces with incomplete creation of the specified properties for forces and (or) headquarters.

Turning to the original, currently valid definitions of the concepts “operation” and “combat actions” in other branches of the Armed Forces, one can see that in our view they coincide with the definitions for the Navy down to the main structural elements. This means that our proposals are applicable to the Armed Forces as a whole.

Marine collection. 2004. No. 3. P. 7.

Naval Dictionary. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 290; Marine encyclopedic dictionary. St. Petersburg: Shipbuilding, 1993. T. 2. P. 313.

This statement does not have the character of an immutable “law”. (Editor's note)

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